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Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of IHRMBs to refugee protection. It first 
considers the well established position that the principle of non-refoulement is enshrined in 
International Human Rights Law and examines its absolute nature. It then examines some of 
the recent jurisprudence by IHRMBs where the risk of prohibited treatment arises on account 
of one of the Refugee Convention grounds for refugee status (namely, race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion) and identifies the 
questions that arise from such findings. Last, it examines the jurisprudence of IHRMBs which 
moves beyond a finding of non-refoulement to discuss matters of status and in particular of 
security of residence. The paper argues that IHRMBs have been instrumental in refugee 
protection by interpreting International Human Rights Law in an inclusive manner, ultimately 
contributing to the acceptance by States and UNHCR that protection of the broad categories 
of refugees covered by International Human Rights Law constitutes a legal obligation (and 
not merely a discretional decision) of States under International Law, an understanding that 
has led to the adoption of specific complementary instruments at regional level and the 
promotion of complementary forms of protection by UNHCR. 
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1. Introduction 
Refugees enjoy a distinct and unique standard of protection under international law within the 
framework of the international regime for the protection of refugees, which is based on the 
Convention on the Status of Refugees
1
 (hereinafter, the Refugee Convention) and its 
                                                 
 PhD in International Law; Senior Lecturer in Law (Newcastle Law School, Newcastle University) and Member 
of the Spanish Bar Council. 
1
 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150, 28 Jul. 1951 (entry into force: 22 Apr. 
1954). 
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Protocol.
2
 The Refugee Convention constitutes a continuation of the legal regime for the 
protection of refugees established in international law in the early 20th Century and it 
predates the establishment of the international regime for the protection of human rights born 
in the United Nations (UN) era. 
While the forced movement of persons across borders and the granting of asylum to 
those fleeing persecution are historical constants, refugee protection only became a matter of 
international law after the First World War. The transformations derived from the dismantling 
of the Empires and the rapid growth in the control of the movement of persons across 
international borders led to a response by the League of Nations. And in this way, those 
movements of persons became of a distinct nature in relation to previous ones, in so far as 
they left the domain of national jurisdiction to become matters of international concern.
3
 
The League of Nations soon received the mandate to find a solution to the refugee 
problem. In this way, the understanding developed that refugees were a special group of 
migrants that required a response from the international community. The adoption of 
international treaties establishing the standard of treatment in relation to refugees reflected the 
mutual recognition among states of their obligations in relation to this category of forced 
migrants.
4
 
It is important to notice that these early instruments did not include one of the most 
fundamental rights of refugees, namely, the right to be granted asylum, an essential premise 
for the enjoyment of other rights. It is at this time when asylum and refugee status became 
separate matters, as the definition of the qualifying features of who is a refugee, as well as the 
status afforded to individuals meeting those criteria, became matters of international law, 
while the granting of asylum for people fleeing persecution remained (as it had always been) 
a matter of national sovereignty. This separation between asylum and refugee status was also 
reflected in the refugee instruments adopted under the auspices of the UN, as neither the 
Refugee Convention nor its Protocol enshrine the right to asylum for refugees. Indeed, the 
drafters of the Refugee Convention were well aware that refugees could find themselves 
without a country of asylum and therefore the Conference that adopted the Convention 
                                                 
2
 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, 31 Jan. 1967 (entry into force: 4 Oct. 1967). 
3
 S. Aga Khan “Legal problems relating to refugees and displaced persons”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de 
Droit International de La Haye, 149, 1976, 287-352, at 296; E. Reale “Le droit d’asile”, Recueil des Cours de 
l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye, 63, 1938, 469-602, at 562. 
4
 For a brief account of international instruments during this period, see G.S. Goodwin-Gill & J. McAdam, The 
Refugee in International Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 16-20. 
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recommended “that Governments continue to receive refugees in their territories and that they 
act in concert in a true spirit of international cooperation in order that these refugees may find 
asylum and the possibility of resettlement” (Recommendation D). The universal regime for 
the protection of refugees has been complemented overtime by regional instruments on 
specific aspects of refugee protection, notably the refugee definition and the standard of rights 
that they are entitle to (refugee status), which do not include the right to asylum or do not do 
so in an explicit manner.
5
 
I have argued elsewhere that the main contribution of International Human Rights Law 
to the protection of refugees has been precisely to amend the situation just described, in 
particular by strengthening the protection against refoulement and by recognising a right to 
asylum as a human right.
6
 The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 
included asylum among its provisions
7
 and while attempts to translate Article 14 UDHR into 
a legally binding rule failed in the universal context, the right to asylum is enshrined in 
international human rights instruments of regional scope.
8
 Indeed, International Human 
                                                 
5
 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 UNTS 45, 10 Sept. 1969 
(entry into force: 20 June 1974); Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the 
International Protection on Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, held in Cartagena on 19 – 22 
November 1984, available at https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_Cartagena_Declaration_on_Refugees.pdf (last 
visited 22 Sept. 2014); and in the European Union (EU), Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless 
persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast), [2011] OJ L 337/9, 20 Dec. 2011. 
The Cartagena Declaration expands the refugee definition but does not address issues of status. Article II of the 
African Convention deals with asylum but it only imposes an obligation on State Parties to “use their best 
endeavours consistent with their respective legislations to receive refugees and to secure the settlement of those 
refugees”. In the EU, Directive 2011/95/EU (the so-called Qualifications Directive) does not refer to a right to 
asylum as such; however the right to be granted status is enshrined in its provisions. For a construction of 
refugee status and subsidiary protection in the Directive as a right to asylum, see M-T. Gil-Bazo, “Refugee status 
and subsidiary protection under EC law: the qualification directive and the right to be granted asylum”, in A. 
Baldaccini, E. Guild, and H. Toner (eds.), Whose Freedom, Security and Justice? EU Immigration and Asylum 
Law and Policy, Oxford, Hart, 2007, 229-264, at 236–239.  
6
 M-T. Gil-Bazo, The Right to Asylum as an Individual Human Right in International Law. Special Reference to 
European Law, Ann Arbor, UMI, 1999. 
7
 United Nations General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA res. 217 A (III), 10 Dec. 
1948, Art. 14, which reads as follows: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution.” 
8
 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), 1144 UNTS 123, 22 Nov. 1969 (entry into force: 18 July 
1978), Art. 22(7), which recognises “the right to seek and be granted asylum”; African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), 1520 UNTS 217, 27 June 1981 (entry into force: 21 Oct. 1986), Art. 12(3), which 
recognises the right “to seek and obtain asylum”; and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
[2000] OJ C 364/1, 18 Dec. 2000 (entry into force: 1 Dec. 2009), Art. 18 – for an interpretation of Art. 18 as 
recognising a right to asylum for individuals, see M-T. Gil-Bazo, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the Right to be Granted Asylum in the Union’s Law”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 27(3), 
2008, 33-52. 
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Rights Law –if only of regional scope- has enshrined the right to be granted asylum, thus 
resulting in States acquiring an international law obligation in that respect.  
A further most significant element is the way in which refugees can invoke the 
protection offered by norms of International Human Rights law in order to conform a standard 
of treatment at all stages in the forced migration process. While the international regime for 
the protection of refugees offers a specific and unique standard of treatment, international 
human rights law strengthens that legal framework by allowing refugees to invoke the 
protection of norms whose scope of application may be wider than those in the refugee 
regime, such as for instance, the absolute prohibition of refoulement to situations where there 
is a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This in turn leads to 
the transformation of the refugee definition.
9
 As Lambert explains, the refugee definition in 
the Refugee Convention “has no equivalent in human rights law [as international human 
rights instruments apply] to everyone, including refugees in the broadest sense of the word 
(particularly asylum-seekers, rejected asylum-seekers and refugees denied protection on 
grounds of national security or public order).”10 Chetail argues that  
human rights law has become the ultimate benchmark for determining who is a 
refugee. The authoritative intrusion of human rights has proved to be instrumental in 
infusing a common and dynamic understanding of the refugee definition that is more 
consonant with and loyal to the evolution of international law.
11
 
These features of the international regime for the protection of human rights have 
strengthened the position of refugees in International Law. While the international refugee 
law regime established by the Refugee Convention and its Protocol remains the primary 
source of refugee rights worldwide, an attempt to identify the rights of refugees under 
international law by reference to the rights found solely under these two instruments is 
severely limited, as it overlooks legal entitlements that refugees may hold (as refugees and in 
other capacities) under other international instruments of universal and regional scope. In fact, 
Chetail explains that “human rights law has radically informed and transformed the distinctive 
tenets of the Geneva Convention to such an extent that the normative frame of forced 
                                                 
9
 Except when otherwise indicated, the term “refugee” in this paper is used in a broad sense, to mean individuals 
entitled to protection under various different legal grounds. 
10
 H. Lambert, “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees: Limits and 
Opportunities”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 24(2), 2005, 39-55, at 39. 
11
 V. Chetail, “Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations between 
Refugee Law and Human Rights Law”, in R. Rubio-Marín (ed.), Human Rights and Immigration, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2014, 19-72, at 28. 
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migration has been displaced from refugee law to human rights law”12 and accordingly he 
argues that “[a]s a result of this systemic evolution, the terms of the debate should be 
inversed: human rights law is the primary source of refugee protection, while the Geneva 
Convention is bound to play a complementary and secondary role.”13 
Key to these developments is the work of the International Human Rights Monitoring 
Bodies (IHRMBs). Despite the lack of an explicit mandate to receive communications from 
individuals regarding their immigration status, IHRMBs have developed a sound body of 
jurisprudence on the rights of refugees14 in relation to entry, stay and non-removal from their 
countries of asylum. It is now well established that International Human Rights Law protects 
individuals against refoulement, as it will be examined below.
15
 However, the jurisprudence 
of IHRMBs has moved beyond non-refoulement to cover entitlements to status, which shall 
be examined below.
16
  
Furthermore, a careful examination of decisions shows that IHRMBs often link the 
risk of refoulement to specific grounds, such as religious beliefs and membership of an ethnic 
group, which according to the Refugee Convention make the individual facing such risk a 
refugee. Although decisions by IHRMBs do not establish a precedent (and in the case of the 
UNHMBs are not strictly speaking legally binding) and IHRMBs do not have jurisdiction to 
pronounce themselves on the refugee status of complainants, the question arises as to the 
legislative response that may be necessary in order to reconcile a prohibition of forced 
removal found by an IHRMB (who can only be seized when all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted), when such prohibition arises from one of the Refugee Convention ground for 
refugee status. The work of IHRMBs also raises questions about the role of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whose mandate is the provision of 
international protection.
17
 This is all the more relevant under EU Law, where subsidiary 
protection is a right of individuals who qualify for it (notably on non-refoulement grounds) 
but who are not refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
18
 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., 22. 
13
 Ibid.. 
14
 Except when otherwise indicated, the term “refugee” is used in a broad sense, to mean individuals entitled to 
protection under various different legal grounds. 
15
 Section 2. 
16
 Section 4. 
17
 United Nations General Assembly, Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, UNGA res. 428(V), 14 Dec. 1950, Art. 1. 
18
 Art. 18 Qualifications Directive, see above footnote 5. 
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This paper examines the contribution of IHRMBs to refugee protection. It first 
considers the well established position that the principle of non-refoulement is enshrined in 
International Human Rights Law and examines its absolute nature. It then examines some of 
the recent jurisprudence by IHRMBs where the risk of prohibited treatment arises on account 
of one of the Refugee Convention grounds for refugee status (namely, race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion) and identifies the 
questions that arise from such findings. Last, it examines the jurisprudence of IHRMBs which 
moves beyond a finding of non-refoulement alone to discuss matters of status and in particular 
of security of residence. The paper argues that IHRMBs have been instrumental in refugee 
protection by interpreting International Human Rights Law in an inclusive manner, ultimately 
contributing to the acceptance by States and UNHCR that protection of the broad categories 
of refugees covered by International Human Rights Law constitutes a legal obligation (and 
not merely a discretional decision) of States under International Law, an understanding that 
has led to the adoption of specific complementary instruments at regional level and the 
promotion of complementary forms of protection by UNHCR.
19
 
2. International Human Rights Law and the Principle of Non-Refoulement 
The understanding that international human rights instruments which do not enshrine a right 
to asylum or an specific non-refoulement clause can offer protection to individuals in need of 
it but who are outside the framework of the Refugee Convention and its Protocol started as a 
jurisprudential construction within the European regional framework,
20
 and later in the 
context of other international human rights instruments.
21
 This developments eventually led to 
the consolidation of the principle of non-refoulement and to the conceptualisation of refugee 
protection under International Human Rights Law as “complementary protection”. This 
section examines these developments. 
                                                 
19
 See Subsidiary Status under the EU Qualifications Directive and Executive Committee for the Programme of 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Safeguarding Asylum, EXCOM Conclusion No. 82 
(XLVIII), 17 Oct. 1997, para. d (vi): “the obligation to treat asylum-seekers and refugees in accordance with 
applicable human rights and refugee law standards, as set out in relevant international instruments” (emphasis 
added). 
20
 See T. Einarsen, “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Notion of an Implied Right to de facto 
asylum”, Internatinal Journal of Refugee Law, 2(3), 1990, 361-389; N. Mole and C. Meredith, Asylum and the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 2010. 
21
 B. Gorlick, “Human Rights and Refugees: Enhancing Protection through International Human Rights Law”, 
Nordic Journal of International Law, 69, 2000, 117–177; B. Gorlick, “The Convention and the Committee 
Against Torture: A Complementary Protection Regime for Refugees”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 11, 
1999, 479-495; H. Lambert, “Protection Against Refoulement from Europe: Human Rights Law Comes to the 
Rescue”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48(3), 1999, 515-544. 
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2.1. The principle of non-refoulement in International Human Rights Law 
From the early 1960s, the now disappeared European Commission of Human Rights 
(ECommHR), established under the (European) Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
22
 (hereinafter, the ECHR) to monitor compliance by State 
Parties with the ECHR, found that despite its silence on asylum and non-refoulement matters, 
the Convention could be applicable to instances of forced removal.
23
 The Commission 
developed a formula which made it clear that matters involving the forced removal to a risk of 
prohibited treatment against Article 3 ECHR could trigger State Parties’ responsibilities under 
this instrument: 
[A]lthough the right to political asylum and the right for a person not to be expelled 
are not as such included among the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, 
the Contracting Parties nevertheless have agreed to restrict the free exercise of their 
powers under general international law, including the power to control the entry and 
exit of aliens, to the extent and within the limits of the obligations which they have 
assumed under the Convention; [...] therefore, the expulsion of a person may, in 
certain exceptional cases, be contrary to the Convention and, in particular, to Article 3 
(Art. 3) thereof [...]
24
 
The well established jurisprudence of the ECommHR was confirmed in 1989 by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Soering,
25
 a case involving extradition. The Court 
confirmed that “in so far as a measure of extradition has consequences adversely affecting the 
enjoyment of a Convention right, it may, assuming that the consequences are not too remote, 
attract the obligations of a Contracting State under the relevant Convention guarantee”.26 
Against the position of the United Kingdom (UK) that the principle of non-refoulement was 
explicitly included in other international treaties and that “it would be straining the language 
of Article 3 (art. 3) intolerably to hold that by surrendering a fugitive criminal the extraditing 
State has “subjected” him to any treatment or punishment that he will receive [...] in the 
receiving State”,27 the Court found that these circumstances “cannot, however, absolve the 
                                                 
22
 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), ETS No. 5, 4 Nov. 1950 (entry into force: 3 Sep. 1953). 
23
 European Commission on Human Rights (ECommHRS), X v. Belgium, Appl. No.984/1961, 1961, 6 Collection 
of Decisions 39. 
24
 ECommHR, X. v. the Federal Republic of Germany (Decision), Appl. No. 4162/69, 1969. 
25
 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Soering v. United Kingdom (Judgment), (1989), Appl. No. 
14038/88. 
26
 ibid., para. 85. 
27
 Ibid., para. 83. 
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Contracting Parties from responsibility under Article 3 (art. 3) for all and any foreseeable 
consequences of extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction.”28 The Court thus found that 
despite the lack of an express non-refoulement provision in the ECHR, such prohibition was 
“already inherent in the general terms of article 3”.29 The Court referred to its previous case-
law to stress that “the Convention is a living instrument which, as the Commission rightly 
stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”.30  
Indeed, the rules of Treaty interpretation are not solely based on the literal 
interpretation of treaties. Rather on the contrary, the general rule of treaty interpretation 
establishes that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”.31 And the context includes “[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties”.32 Therefore, the existence of specific non-refoulement 
provisions in other international instruments rather than imposing a restrictive literal 
interpretation of Article 3 ECHR, actually call for an interpretation that takes account of the 
developing rules of international law in relation to non-refoulement and in the light of the 
object and purpose of the ECHR itself. The Court therefore found that 
It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that 
“common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law” to which 
the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a fugitive to 
another State where there were substantial grounds for believing that he would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly committed. 
Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and 
general wording of Article 3 (art. 3), would plainly be contrary to the spirit and 
intendment of the Article, and in the Court’s view this inherent obligation not to 
extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving 
State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
proscribed by that Article (art. 3).
33
 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., para. 86. 
29
 Ibid., para. 88. 
30
 ECtHR, Tyrer v. United Kingdom (Judgment), (1978), Appl. No. 5856/72. 
31
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969 (entry into force: 27 Jan. 1980), 
Art. 31(1) (emphasis added). 
32
 Ibid., Art. 31(2)(c). 
33
 ibid., para. 88 (emphasis added). 
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The ECtHR has reaffirmed its position consistently over the years, including when confronted 
with the complex challenges posed by circumstances disturbing public order. In the Chahal 
case, the UK argued that 
the guarantees afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) were not absolute in cases where a 
Contracting State proposed to remove an individual from its territory. Instead, in such 
cases [...] various factors should be taken into account, including the danger posed by 
the person in question to the security of the host nation. Thus, there was an implied 
limitation to Article 3 (art. 3) entitling a Contracting State to expel an individual to a 
receiving State even where a real risk of ill-treatment existed, if such removal was 
required on national security grounds. [...] In the alternative, the threat posed by an 
individual to the national security of the Contracting State was a factor to be weighed 
in the balance when considering the issues under Article 3 (art. 3). [...] The greater the 
risk of ill-treatment, the less weight should be accorded to the threat to national 
security.
34
 
The Court’s response was unequivocal. While it acknowledged “the immense difficulties 
faced by States in modern times in protecting their communities from terrorist violence”,35 it 
also reaffirmed that just as “the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the victim’s conduct [...] even in the event 
of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation [...]. The prohibition provided by 
Article 3 (art. 3) against ill-treatment is equally absolute in expulsion cases.” 36 The Court’s 
doctrinal position was worded in the following terms: 
Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual 
would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) if 
removed to another State, the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him 
or her against such treatment is engaged in the event of expulsion [...]. In these 
circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however undesirable or 
dangerous, cannot be a material consideration.
37
 
                                                 
34
 ECtHR, Chahal v. United Kingdom (Judgment), (1996), Application No. 22414/93, para. 76 (emphasis added). 
35
 ibid., para. 79. 
36
 ibid., paras. 79-80 (emphasis added). 
37
 ibid., para. 80. 
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The Court specifically referred to the interaction between the ECHR and the Refugee 
Convention in this regard, affirming that “[t]he protection afforded by Article 3 (art. 3) is thus 
wider than that provided by Articles 32 and 33 of the [Refugee Convention]”.38 
Despite attempts to reopen the discussion in the same terms (that is, the need to 
conduct a balancing test when national security issues are at stake), the Court has maintained 
its position on the absolute nature of the prohibition to remove someone to a risk of torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In the Saadi case, the UK attempted to 
reverse the Chahal doctrine. Although Saadi was a case against Italy and the Italian 
Government was not questioning the absolute nature of Article 3, the UK Government sought 
to intervene as a third-party in order to try and reverse the Court’s well-established case-law, 
given that in its view, “because of its rigidity that principle had caused many difficulties for 
the Contracting States by preventing them in practice from enforcing expulsion measures”.39 
The UK argued that “in cases concerning the threat created by international terrorism, the 
approach followed by the Court in Chahal (which did not reflect a universally recognised 
moral imperative and was in contradiction with the intentions of the original signatories of the 
Convention) had to be altered and clarified”.40 
The UK’s reference to a “universally recognised moral imperative” is intriguing, as it 
is its reference to “the intentions of the original signatories of the Convention”. Either the UK 
suggests that the prohibition to remove someone to a risk of torture has no strong moral 
foundation or it persists in attempting to build the argument (consistently rejected by 
IHRMBs) that although State Parties to the ECHR intended to create a legally binding 
obligation among themselves to prohibit torture, they also intended to retain the power to put 
someone at a risk of torture elsewhere, as long as such risk is at the hands of another State.  
The morality of torture has been explored at length in the literature and it is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Suffice to note that one of the scholars who has explored the relationship 
between the morality and the legality of torture at length concludes that torture must always 
remain illegal: 
Does the possibility that torture might be justifiable in some of the rarefied situations 
which can be imagined provide any reason to consider relaxing the legal prohibitions 
against it? Absolutely not. The distance between the situations which must be 
                                                 
38
 ibid. 
39
 ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy (Judgment), (2008), Application No. 37201/06, para. 117. 
40
 ibid., para. 122. 
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concocted in order to have a plausible case of morally permissible torture and the 
situations which actually occur is, if anything, further reason why the existing 
prohibitions against torture should remain and should be strengthened [...]
41
 
As for the extraterritorial application of International Human Rights Law which the UK 
insisted in questioning, IHRMBs have consistently affirmed that States are prevented from 
doing abroad what they are forbidden to do at home. As early as 1981, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), established by Article 28 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (hereinafter, ICCPR),
42
 clarified that the duties of State Parties towards 
individuals subject to their jurisdiction do not refer “to the place where the violation occurred, 
but rather to the relationship between the individual and the State in relation to a violation of 
any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred.”43 This position has been 
consistently held by IHRMBs and it has been well explored in the literature.
44
 
The ECtHR rejected the UK arguments in Saadi and it took the chance to note that it 
had already done so before: “The Court further observes that similar arguments to those put 
forward by the third-party intervener in the present case have already been rejected in the 
Chahal judgment cited above.”45 The Court reaffirmed that 
[s]ince protection against the treatment prohibited by Article 3 is absolute, that 
provision imposes an obligation not to extradite or expel any person who, in the 
receiving country, would run the real risk of being subjected to such treatment. As the 
Court has repeatedly held, there can be no derogation from that rule [...]. It must 
therefore reaffirm the principle stated in Chahal [...] that it is not possible to weigh the 
risk of ill-treatment against the reasons put forward for the expulsion in order to 
determine whether the responsibility of a State is engaged under Article 3, even where 
                                                 
41
 H. Shue, “Torture”, in S. Levinson (ed.), Torture. A Collection, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, 47-60, 
at 58. 
42
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 16 Dec. 1966 (entry into force: 23 March 
1976). 
43
 United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC), López Burgos v. Uruguay (1981), Communication No. 
52/1979, para. 12.2. The HRC confirmed and developed its position in a General Comment adopted in 2004; 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General Legal 
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004, para. 
10. 
44
 For an analysis of the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, see for instance R. Wilde, “The 
extraterritorial application of international human rights law on civil and political rights”, in N. Rodley and S. 
Sheeran (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Human Rights, London, Routledge, 2013, 635-661. For a discussion of 
the territorial scope of the Refugee Convention, including extraterritorially, see M-T. Gil-Bazo, “Article 40 1951 
Convention (Territorial application clause)”, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), The 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 1567-1588.  
45
 See above footone 31, para. 141. 
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such treatment is inflicted by another State. In that connection, the conduct of the 
person concerned, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be taken into account, 
with the consequence that the protection afforded by Article 3 is broader than that 
provided for in Articles 32 and 33 of the [Refugee Convention]
46
 
The absolute nature of the prohibition to remove someone to a risk of torture has also been 
affirmed by the IHRMBs in the universal system. As in the case of the ECHR, the ICCPR 
does not include a specific non-refoulement provision. Although the HRC’s attitude was 
hesitant at first towards finding an implicit prohibition of non-refoulement in the ICCPR (and 
notably on Articles 6 and 7, on the right to life and the prohibition of torture, respectively), it 
evolved over time to accept such prohibition, most likely influenced by the case-law of the 
ECtHR. The HRC was confronted with the question for the first time in an extradition case 
lodged in 1987.
47
 The author of the communication referred to the jurisprudence by the 
ECommHR and against the State Party’s observations that there is no right to asylum in the 
ICCPR and that accordingly that aspect of the Communication should be declared 
inadmissible ratione materiae,
48
 the author argued that “his communication does not invoke a 
right of asylum, and that a distinction must be made between the request for a right of asylum, 
and asylum resulting from the establishment of certain mechanisms to remedy violations of 
the Covenant alleged by individuals”,49 which constitutes the object of the Communication. 
The HRC was however not persuaded to express itself on this matter and declared its lack of 
jurisdiction noting that “[w]ith regard to article 6 of the Covenant, the author has merely 
expressed fear for his life in the hypothetical case that he should be deported to El Salvador. 
The Committee cannot examine hypothetical violations of Covenant rights which might occur 
in the future”.50 It is worth noting that at that time the ECtHR had not yet expressed itself on 
an implicit right to non-refoulement derived from the prohibition of torture in Article 3 ECHR 
and perhaps the HRC did not find the ECommHR jurisprudence persuasive enough to go 
beyond the literal terms of Article 6 ICCPR. A few years later however, and following the 
Soering case, the HRC modified its approach. In the case of Kindler, where Articles 6 and 7 
ICCPR were invoked, the HRC held that 
                                                 
46
 ibid., para. 138. 
47
 HRC, V.M.R.B. v. Canada (1988), Communication No. 236/1987.  
48
 ibid., para. 4.3. 
49
 ibid., (emphasis added). 
50
 ibid. para. 6.3 (emphasis added). 
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what is at issue is [...] whether by extraditing Mr. Kindler to the United States, Canada 
exposed him to a real risk of a violation of his rights under the Covenant. States parties 
to the Covenant will often also be party to various bilateral obligations, including 
those under extradition treaties. A State party to the Covenant is required to ensure 
that it carries out all its other legal commitments in a manner consistent with the 
Covenant. The starting point for an examination of this issue must be the obligation of 
the State party under article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, namely, to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in 
the Covenant. The right to life is the most essential of these rights.
51
  
Accordingly, “[i]f a State party extradites a person within its jurisdiction in circumstances 
such that as a result there is a real risk that his or her rights under the Covenant will be 
violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant.”52 
Although the HRC eventually declared that no violation of Articles 6 and 7 ICCPR had taken 
place,
53
 the decision was controversial, resulting in seven members of the HRC issuing 
individual opinions. Once the principle had been established that force removal resulting in a 
violation of the ICCPR-guaranteed rights could engage the responsibility of State Parties, the 
HRC found a violation of Article 7 ICCPR for the first time in an extradition case a few 
months later, in the case of Ng.
54
 This decision was also controversial, resulting in nine 
members of the HRC issuing individual opinions. 
Today the position of the HRC in relation to non-refoulement is unequivocal and has 
been summarised in its General Comment No. 31: 
the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the Covenant 
rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails an 
obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their 
territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either 
in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person 
may subsequently be removed
55
 
The HRC has also confirmed   
                                                 
51
 HRC, Joseph Kindler v. Canada (1993), Communication No. 470/1991, para. 13.1. 
52
 ibid., para. 13.2. 
53
 ibid., para. 16. 
54
 HRC, Ng v. Canada (1993), Communication No. 469/1991. 
55
 See above footone 35, para. 12. 
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the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, which in no circumstances can be derogated from. Such treatments can 
never be justified on the basis of a balance to be found between society’s interest and 
the individual’s rights under article 7 of the Covenant. No person, without any 
exception, even those suspected of presenting a danger to national security or the 
safety of any person, and even during a state of emergency, may be deported to a 
country where he/she runs the risk of being subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.
56
 
Unlike previous human rights instruments, the Convention Against Torture
57
 (hereinafter, 
CAT) was the first international human rights treaty of universal scope (after the Refugee 
Convention) to include an express non-refoulement provision. Unlike Article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention, Article 3 CAT does not allow for derogations or exceptions: “No State 
Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are 
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” 
Negotiations on this article were far from smooth. The travaux préparatoires show the 
divergent positions among delegations on the scope of application of Article 3, but also the 
strong support that the inclusion of non-refoulement provision received by States. The 
original proposal on Article 3 (presented by Sweden in 1979) contained a clause aimed at 
delimiting the application of the provision in relation to prosecuting certain international 
crimes by establishing that the non-refoulement clause shall not be invoked in order not to 
prosecute crimes against peace, crimes against humanity or war crimes.
58
 However further to 
discussions, States rejected the inclusion of the principle aut dedere aut judicare in a second 
paragraph of Article 3, as delegations feared that it may be interpreted to restrict the scope of 
application of the principle of non-refoulement.
59
  
The principle aut dedere aut judicare did find its way into the Convention as a 
separate provision in Article 7(1) -in relation to extradition- and the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has had the chance to pronounce itself on it in the case of Hissène Habré, the 
former President of the Republic of Chad in the 1980s who found refuge in Senegal. In the 
                                                 
56
 HRC, Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee. Canada, UN Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, 20 
Apr. 2006, para. 15 (emphasis added). 
57
 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1465 UNTS 
85, 10 Dec. 1984 (entry into force: 26 June 1987). 
58
 UN Doc. E/CN.4/L.1470. 
59
 Ibid., and also UN Doc. E/CN.4/1367 and UN Doc. E/CN.4/L.1567. For an overview and discussion of the 
drafting history of Article 3, see above Gil-Bazo footnote 6, pp. 233-238. 
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ICJ’s view, the consequence of this treaty obligation is not a prohibition to grant protection 
(as in fact, States also have a non-refoulement obligation under Article 3), but rather a 
limitation for States to do so. The Court ruled that “Senegal must […] take without further 
delay the necessary measures to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution, if it does not extradite Mr. Habré” (emphasis added).60 The Court noted that 
while prosecution is an obligation under the CAT, extradition is merely an option: 
“[e]xtradition is an option offered to the State by the Convention”61 in order to facilitate State 
compliance with the Convention’s purpose “to prevent alleged perpetrators of acts of torture 
from going unpunished.”62 Furthermore, extradition may be hindered if its requirements 
cannot be met. In the case in question, the Court recalls that the individual can only be 
extradited “to a State which has jurisdiction in some capacity, pursuant to Article 5 of the 
Convention, to prosecute and try him”,63 which allows extradition only to States who can 
claim jurisdiction on the basis of the territorial or nationality principles.
64
  
Further evidence of the absolute nature of the non-refoulement prohibition under 
Article 3 CAT can be found in the position of States regarding reservations to this provision. 
The reservation on Article 3 CAT introduced by Chile at the time of its ratification on 30 
September 1988 “by reason of the discretionary and subjective nature of the terms in which it 
is drafted”65 was met with the strongest opposition by other State Parties. Australia, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, UK, and Sweden all rejected Chile’s reservation 
immediately on the grounds that it was incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
treaty,
66
 which is “to strengthen the existing prohibition of torture and similar practices”, thus 
forcing Chile to withdraw it on 7 September 1990.
67
 The strong and unequivocal rejection 
against the reservation to Article 3 reflects the understanding among State Parties about its 
non-derogable character. 
The Committee Against Torture (CteAT) set up under Article 17 CAT has affirmed 
consistently the absolute nature of the non-refoulement prohibition enshrined in Article 3 
                                                 
60
 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) [2012] ICJ Reports 422, 
para. 121. 
61
 Ibid., para. 95. 
62
 Ibid., para. 120. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 Article 5(1) CAT. 
65
 UN Doc. CAT/C/2/rev.5, p. 12. 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 See above footnote 57, the Netherlands, p. 28. 
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CAT, even in cases involving national security: “The Committee recalls that the Convention’s 
protections are absolute, even in the context of national security concerns”68 and where the 
individual falls under the exclusion clauses of Article 1F of the Refugee Convention:  
The Committee considers that the test of article 3 of the Convention is absolute. 
Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing that an individual would be in danger 
of being subjected to torture upon expulsion to another State, the State party is under 
obligation not to return the person concerned to that State. The nature of the activities 
in which the person concerned engaged cannot be a material consideration when 
making a determination under article 3 of the Convention
69
 
The CteAT’s contribution to the principle of non-refoulement is explored in its various 
nuances by a separate contribution to this Special Issue and therefore, there is no need to 
elaborate further on it at this stage.
70
 
In sum, the prohibition to remove someone to a risk of prohibited treatment has been 
unequivocally reaffirmed by IHRMBs, both at the universal and regional levels, either on the 
basis of an express non-refoulement provision (CAT) or more generally as implicitly 
enshrined in other human rights obligations under relevant international human rights 
instruments (ICCPR, ECHR). The prohibition is absolute, allowing for no derogation or 
exception under any circumstances, in the case where the force removal exposes an individual 
to a risk of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
71
 The principle 
of non-refoulement is accepted by State Parties to the Refugee Convention and its Protocol 
and by UNHCR as customary international law,
72
 a view generally supported by the 
                                                 
68
 United Nations Committee Against Torture (CteAT), Agiza v. Sweden (2005), Communication No. 233/2003, 
para. 13.8. 
69
 CteAT, Tapia Paez v. Sweden (1997), Communication No. 39/1996, para. 14.5. 
70
 See F. M. Mariño Menéndez, “Recent Jurisprudence by the United Nations Committee Against Torture and 
the International Protection of Refugees”. 
71
 R. Bruin and K. Wouters, “Terrorism And The Non-Derogability Of Non-Refoulement”, International Journal 
of Refugee Law, 15(1), 2003, 5-29. Although the wording of Art. 3 CAT exclusively refers to torture, the CteAT 
has taken a wholistic approach, noting a continuity between torture and other categories of prohibited treatment: 
“The obligation to prevent ill-treatment in practice overlaps with and is largely congruent with the obligation to 
prevent torture. […] In practice, the definitional threshold between ill-treatment and torture is often not clear. 
Experience demonstrates that the conditions that give rise to ill-treatment frequently facilitate torture and 
therefore the measures required to prevent torture must be applied to prevent ill-treatment. Accordingly, the 
Committee has considered the prohibition of ill-treatment to be likewise non-derogable under the Convention 
and its prevention to be an effective and non-derogable measure” (emphasis added); United Nations Committee 
Against Torture, General Comment No. 2: Implementation of article 2 by States parties, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/2, 
24 January 2008, para. 3. The matter is analysed extensively in another contribution to this Special Issue; see F. 
M. Mariño Menéndez, “Recent Jurisprudence”, see above 70. 
72
 Ministerial Meeting of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the status of 
refugees, Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and or Its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
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literature,
73
 while States in the Latin American region affirm its jus cogens nature,
74
 a view 
which has also found some echo in the literature.
75
 
2.2. Protection under human rights law: complementary protection 
The principle of non-refoulement in human rights instruments, which allows for no derogation 
or exception and applies without a link to a particular status (race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion), and thus broadens the protection 
offered by the Refugee Convention has had an enormous impact on the way in which refugee 
protection is now conceptualised. Developments by IHRMBs have been incorporated into 
national legislation, although this has taken different forms, notably, the granting of a single 
status (as it is the case in the US and Canada, and used to be the case in Spain prior to the 
1994 reform), while in the EU they have led to a specific and separate status called subsidiary 
protection. I have argued elsewhere that individuals who benefit from the protection of this 
“expanded” principle of non-refoulement have a right to asylum, together with individuals 
who meet the criteria in the Refugee Convention.
76
 The term asylum refers to the institution 
for protection, which is historically well known, and it is different from refugee status, as the 
latter refers to one of the categories of individuals –among others- who qualify for such 
protection under international law and the standard of treatment that they are to receive. The 
term and content of asylum as the institution for protection known historically to international 
law, is not defined by any international instruments. State practice shows that it has been 
conceptualised in different ways through history to include different categories of individuals, 
including refugees within the meaning of the Refugee Convention, but also others. This is 
currently the case in a number of constitutions worldwide.
77
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Refugees, 13 Dec. 2001, UN Doc. HCR/MMSP/2001/09, 16 Jan. 2002, Preamble, para 4; United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-
Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 
Geneva, Jan. 2007, para. 15. 
73
 Sir E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, “The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: 
Opinion”, in E. Feller, V. Türk and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, 89-177, at 155-158; but cf J. Hathaway, “The Rights of Refugees under 
International Law”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 363-367. 
74
 “This principle is imperative in regard to refugees and in the present state of international law should be 
acknowledged and observed as a rule of jus cogens”, Cartagena Declaration, see above footnote 5, para. 5. 
75
 J. Allain, “The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 13, 2001, 
533-558. 
76
 See above footnote 6. See also, M-T. Gil-Bazo, “Respuestas del Derecho internacional ante la transformación 
del régimen de asilo en Europa”, Migraciones, 1, 1997, 217-272. 
77
 M-T. Gil-Bazo, “Asylum in the practice of Latin American and African States”, New Issues in Refugee 
Research, 249, Jan. 2013. 
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Developments in the European Union led to eventually to the adoption of the first 
legal instrument of supranational nature containing a separate status for individuals protected 
under international human rights law, which is to be complementary to the Refugee 
Convention, rather than to the adoption of a single status for all persons granted asylum, 
whether on Refugee Convention grounds or on international human rights law grounds. This 
is a regrettable approach and one that the European Commission and EU Member States 
might need to revise. As McAdam explains 
it is essential to appreciate that the ‘complementary’ aspect of ‘complementary 
protection’ [derived from international human rights law] is not the form of protection 
or resultant status accorded to an individual, but rather the source of the additional 
protection. Its chief function is to provide an alternative basis for eligibility for 
protection.
78
 
The adoption of a Subsidiary Protection Status at EU level finds its roots in the 1996 
Amsterdam Treaty, which introduced a mandate for the Council of Ministers of the EU to 
adopt legislation (minimum standards) “for persons who otherwise need international 
protection”79 (in addition to refugee status and temporary protection). Although Member 
States already had a variety of so-called “B Statuses”, while others granted a single asylum 
status for everyone in need of protection, regardless of the qualifying grounds, the term 
“Subsidiary Protection” was only coined later by the European Commission in its paper 
opening the ground for discussion on a uniform status for persons granted asylum. The 
Commission considered the option of having “[a] single status, conferring the same types of 
rights on refugees recognised under the Geneva Convention and on persons enjoying 
subsidiary protection”.80 However, this option was not favoured by all Member States and 
therefore, the Commission’s proposal for a Directive on the matter introduced two separate 
statuses. The Proposal’s Explanatory Memorandum notes that Subsidiary Protection is of 
complementary nature to the Refugee Convention and based on international human rights 
law: 
                                                 
78
 J. McAdam, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, 
23. 
79
 Art. 63(3)(a) Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty, OJ 
C 340/173, 10 Nov. 1997. 
80
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
Towards a common asylum procedure and a uniform status, valid throughout the Union, for persons granted 
asylum, COM(2000) 755 final, 22 Nov. 2000, p. 12. 
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The subsidiary protection measures proposed are considered complementary to the 
protection regime enshrined in the Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol and are 
to be implemented in such a manner that they do not undermine but instead 
complement the existing refugee protection regime. The definition of subsidiary 
protection employed in this Proposal is based largely on international human rights 
instruments.
81
 
This regional approach seems to have been later endorsed globally by UNHCR, which 
considered complementary protection in its 2000 Global Consultations and rather than calling 
for an expanded refugee definition (as in the African or Latin American regions) or a single 
status for all persons in need of protection, adopted an Agenda for protection with two 
concrete objectives regarding the complementary protection framework: 
Within the framework of its mandate, ExCom to work on a Conclusion containing 
guidance on general principles upon which complementary forms of protection should 
be based, on the persons who might benefit from it, and on the compatibility of these 
protections with the 1951 Convention and other relevant international and regional 
instruments. 
States to consider the merits of establishing a single procedure in which there is first 
an examination of the 1951 Convention grounds for refugee status, to be followed, as 
necessary and appropriate, by the examination of the possible grounds for the grant of 
complementary forms of protection.
82
 
ExCom’s Conclusion was eventually adopted in 2005 promoting the use of complementary 
protection among States worldwide: “The Executive Committee [...] [e]ncourages the use of 
complementary forms of protection for individuals in need of international protection who do 
not meet the refugee definition under the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol”.83  
3. International Human Rights Monitoring Bodies and Findings of Persecution and/or 
Risk of Prohibited Treatment on Refugee Convention grounds 
                                                 
81
 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and 
status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection (presented by the Commission), COM(2001) 510 final, 12 Sept. 2001, p. 5 (emphasis 
added). The Directive as eventually adopted in 2004 reflected these two separate statuses, which were later 
confirmed in the Recast Directive of 2011; Council Directive 2004/83/EC, see above footnote 5. 
82
 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Global Consultations on International 
Protection. Agenda for Protection, UN Doc. A/AC.96/965/Add.1, 26 June 2002, Goal 1, Objective 3, pp. 6-7 
(emphasis added). 
83
 Executive Committee for the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusion 
on the Provision on International Protection Including Through Complementary Forms of Protection, EXCOM 
Conclusion No. 103 (LVI), 7 Oct. 2005, para. (i) (emphasis added). 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the Refugee Survey 
Quarterly following peer review. The version of record M-T Gil-Bazo, ‘Refugee Protection under International 
Human Rights Law: From Non-Refoulement to Residence and Citizenship’ (2015) 34(1) Refugee Survey 
Quarterly is available online at: http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org.  
 
20 
 
The role of IHRMBs seems to be taking a step beyond the mere finding of a violation of the 
principle of non-refoulement to ascertaining a causal link between the risk of prohibited 
treatment under international human rights law and one of the Refugee Convention grounds 
(race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion). This 
raises important issues in so far as it suggests that the person –who must have exhausted all 
domestic remedies before bringing a claim to an IHRMB- is not only protected by 
international human rights law against refoulement, but is also a refugee within the meaning 
of the Refugee Convention. Yet, IHRMBs have no jurisdiction to determine refugee status 
and therefore, such findings do not automatically result in the recognition of refugee status. 
In recent years a trend seems to be emerging for IHRMBs to go beyond the finding 
that a forced removal is or would be in violation of the relevant treaty provision to link the 
risk of such violation to one of the Refugee Convention grounds, such as religious beliefs, 
ethnicity, membership of a particular social group or (real or imputed) political opinion. 
3.1. Risk of prohibited treatment arising from race 
IHMBs have often made reference to the individual’s ethnic membership as the source of the 
risk of prohibited treatment. As Hathaway and Foster explain the term race is to be given a 
broad meaning “to include all forms of identifiable ethnicity.”84 They further explain that race 
within the meaning of the Refugee Convention “may be defined by ethnicity or cultural or 
linguistic distinctiveness, and frequently overlaps with other Convention grounds.”85 
 In the much discussed case of Salah Sheekh, the ECtHR found that risk of prohibited 
treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR arouse from the applicant’s membership of a 
minority and that such membership (given the particular circumstances of the case) was in 
itself sufficient evidence of a real risk.
86
 
Similar findings have been made by other IHRMBs in the universal system. In SM, 
HM and AM,
87
 the CteAT noted that 
the complainants’ claim that they run a risk of torture in Azerbaijan on account of 
S.M.’s mixed origin, which makes them a target for the authorities in their home 
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country. It further notes their allegation that due to S.M.’s Armenian origins, the 
whole family was subjected to ethnically motivated persecution
88
 
The Committee found that on the basis of the authors’ prior experiences and 
general information available to the Committee, according to which a hostile attitude 
on the part of the general public towards ethnic Armenians living in Azerbaijan is still 
widespread, [...] persons of Armenian origin are at risk of discrimination in their daily 
life, [...] they are harassed or bribes are requested by low-ranking officials when they 
apply for passports and they often conceal their identity by legally changing the ethnic 
designation in their passports, the Committee considers that the complainants’ return 
to Azerbaijan would expose them to a foreseeable, real and personal risk of torture 
within the meaning of article 3 of the Convention.
89
 
3.2. Risk of prohibited treatment arising from religious beliefs 
In Abdussamatov,
90
 the CteAT examined a complaint by a group of 29 Uzbeks who were 
“practitioners of Islam and fled Uzbekistan for fear of persecution for practising their religion. 
Twelve (12) complainants were recognized as mandate refugees by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) between 2005 and March 2010.”91 Most 
of the complainants had been recognised as refugees by UNHCR and others were asylum-
seekers at the time of their extradition to Uzbekistan on the grounds of their commission of 
serious crimes. According to the complainants 
Pursuant to article 12 of [Kazakhstan’s] Refugee Act, refugee status cannot be granted 
where there are serious grounds to believe that the interested individuals participate or 
had participated in the activities of forbidden religious organizations. On this ground, 
having studied the materials on file, UNHCR has decided to annul the refugee 
certificates previously issued to a number of the complainants.
92
 
The complainants also noted that “[a]n expert from UNHCR in Geneva participated in the 
examination and had access to all meetings and documentation” in the extradition process.93 
UNHCR’s role in the extradition process as well as its decision to withdraw status -as 
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communicated by the applicants- is not disputed in the proceedings. In fact, the Committee 
noted  
the State party’s assertion that its proceedings were monitored by UNHCR [...] The 
Committee further notes counsel’s claim that in the cases of four of the 29 
complainants UNHCR was against their extradition and that counsel did not have 
access to information about the UNHCR position in other cases
94
 
The Committee found that the complainants’ extradition was a violation of Article 3 CAT and 
noted that “all 29 complainants are Muslims reportedly practising their religion outside of 
official Uzbek institutions or belonging to religious extremist organizations.”95 The 
Committee further elaborated on this point: 
[T]he Committee considers that in its own concluding observations, as well as in the 
information presented to it, the pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights and the significant risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
in Uzbekistan, in particular for individuals practising their faith outside of the official 
framework, has been sufficiently established. In addition, it observes that the 
complainants argued that they were subjected to religious persecution, in some cases 
including detention and torture, before they fled to Kazakhstan.”96  
The HRC has also made similar findings. In Choudhary,
97
  
the Committee notes that recent reports point to the fact that religious minorities, 
including Shias, continue to face fierce persecution and insecurity; that the Pakistani 
authorities are unable, or unwilling, to protect them; that the Government of Pakistan 
has dropped a proposed amendment to section 295(C) of the Criminal Code (i.e. the 
blasphemy law) […] and that there has been an upsurge of blasphemy cases in 2012.98 
The HRC therefore found that expulsion would constitute a violation of Articles 6 and 7 
ICCPR: 
In the light of the situation prevailing in Pakistan, due weight must be given to the 
author’s allegations. In this context, the Committee has taken note of the allegations 
that a fatwa had been issued against the author and a First Information Report had 
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been filed against him under the blasphemy law, and that blasphemy charges incur the 
death penalty under the criminal law of Pakistan. While death sentences have 
reportedly not been carried out, several instances of extrajudicial assassination, by 
private actors, of members of religious minorities accused under the blasphemy law 
have been reported, without the Pakistani authorities being willing, or able, to protect 
them.
99
 
3.3. Risk of prohibited treatment arising from political opinion 
Political dissent has also been noted by IHRMBs as the reason for the risk of prohibited 
treatment. In Maksudov,
100
 the HRC examined the case of four complainants, all Uzbek 
nationals who at the time of submission of their cases had been recognised as refugee by 
UNHCR and were held in a detention awaiting removal to Uzbekistan on the basis of an 
extradition request.
101
 The HRC found a violation of Articles 6 and 7 ICCPR. The Committee  
considers at the outset that it was known, or should have been known, to the State party’s 
authorities at the time of the authors’ extradition that there were widely noted and credible 
public reports that Uzbekistan resorted to consistent and widespread use of torture against 
detainees13 and that the risk of such treatment was usually high in the case of detainees 
held for political and security reasons. In the Committee’s view, these elements in their 
combination show that the authors faced a real risk of torture in Uzbekistan if 
extradited.
102
 
Likewise, in Hamida,
103
 the Committee considered “that the author has provided substantial 
evidence of a real and personal risk of his being subjected to treatment contrary to article 7 of 
the Covenant, on account of his dissent in the Tunisian police”104 and concluded that “there is 
a real risk of the author being regarded as a political opponent and therefore subjected to 
torture. This risk is increased by the asylum application which he submitted in Canada, since 
this makes it all the more possible that the author will be seen as a regime opponent.”105 The 
Committee found that the expulsion order (if enforced) would constitute a violation of the 
principle of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 7 ICCPR. 
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3.4. Risk of prohibited treatment arising from membership from a particular social group 
Membership from a particular social group has also been found to be at the origin of the risk. 
In M. I.
106
 the Committee noted “the author’s claim that her return to Bangladesh would 
expose her to a risk of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
due to her sexual orientation.”107 The Committee found that expulsion would expose the 
author of the communication to a risk of torture observing that 
the Criminal Code of Bangladesh forbids homosexual acts; and that homosexuals are 
stigmatized in Bangladesh society. The Committee considers that the existence of such 
a law in itself fosters the stigmatization of LGTB individuals and constitutes an 
obstacle to the investigation and sanction of acts of persecution against these persons. 
The Committee considers that in deciding her asylum request the State party’s 
authorities focused mainly on inconsistencies and ambiguities in the author’s account 
of specific supporting facts. However, the inconsistencies and ambiguities mentioned 
are not of a nature as to undermine the reality of the feared risks. Against the 
background of the situation faced by persons belonging to sexual minorities, as 
reflected in reports provided by the parties, the Committee is of the view that, in the 
particular case of the author, the State party failed to take into due consideration the 
author’s allegations regarding the events she experienced in Bangladesh because of 
her sexual orientation — in particular her mistreatment by the police — in assessing 
the alleged risk she would face if returned to her country of origin. Accordingly, in 
such circumstances, the Committee considers that the author’s deportation to 
Bangladesh would constitute a violation of article 7 of the Covenant.
108
 
The Committee further reminded the State Party that it is also “under the obligation to take 
steps to prevent similar violations in the future.”109 
3.5. Protection under human rights instruments, refugee status and the role of UNHCR 
The previous sections have shown that the interpretation of international human rights treaties 
by IHRMBs cannot be dissociated from its implications for the interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention. The obvious conclusion to the previous analysis is that if the bodies entrusted by 
States Parties with the authority to undertake an authentic interpretation of international 
human rights treaties find that an applicant is at risk of prohibited treatment due to his or her 
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ethnic background, religious beliefs, political opinion or membership of a particular social 
group, then it follows that the applicant is a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee 
Convention. While IHRMBs do not have jurisdiction to interpret the Refugee Convention, 
State Parties to this instrument who are also bound by other international human rights treaties 
must find a way to reconcile their obligations under the various instruments. 
 In particular, the question arises as to the mechanism to implement decisions by 
IHRMBs in the domestic legal order, and in particular, the consideration that the means that a 
State Party to the relevant instrument may choose to undertake must necessarily be those that 
reconcile its obligations both under International Human Rights Law and under International 
Refugee Law. And this may mean that the only appropriate means to do so is by recognising 
refugee status and granting asylum. 
In this regard, the role of UNHCR is crucial. While UNHCR is not an IHRMB and it 
lacks the impartiality and objectivity that is expected from IHRMBs, its mandate requires 
UNHCR to be concerned with refugee protection and Article 35 of the Refugee Convention 
imposes on State Parties an obligation to cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its 
functions, and therefore in the provision of protection.
110
 UNHCR however does not seem to 
have played a fundamental role in the promotion of refugee-relevant UN human rights 
standards so far, and it has certainly withdrawn in cases involving national security, as it has 
been noted above. It appears that this is an area in which UNHCR can develop further creative 
thinking, perhaps in a similar way as it has already done in the context of the EU.
111
 
In the European context, the duty to comply with International Human Rights 
obligations and to interpret the Refugee Convention in accordance with developments in 
International Human Rights Law begs the question as to the appropriateness of the decision 
for the legislator to adopt two different statuses at EU level, one for refugees within the 
meaning of the Refugee Convention and another one (with a lower level of entitlements) for 
refugees in the broader sense whose protection grounds arise in International Human Rights 
Law. Under Article 15 of the EU Qualifications Directive, non-refoulement arising from 
human rights grounds would trigger Subsidiary Protection, and yet if the finding is that the 
risk of refoulement arises from one of the Refugee Convention grounds, the individual in 
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question is a refugee, which questions the primacy of the Refugee Convention and the 
complementary nature of Subsidiary Protection.
112
 As it has already been stated above, the 
review of the Qualifications Directive to consider a single status for both refugees within the 
meaning of the Refugee Convention and for the broader category of refugees protected under 
International Human Rights Law –as already discussed by the European Commission- might 
provide the better way for EU Member States to comply with their international obligations 
towards refugees.  
4. Moving Beyond: Human Rights Protection and Status 
While the role of IHMBs in strengthening the protection of refugees against refoulement is 
well established, these bodies have always been cautious about the nature of the measures that 
States may need to take, stressing that the nature of the obligation to protect is one of result, 
leaving a margin of appreciation to States on the ways in which this may be achieved. Despite 
this clear standing, however, a trend seems to be emerging among IHRMBs to pronounce 
themselves on whether the approach taken by State Parties, and notably the type of 
immigration status afforded to non-removable non-nationals is sufficient to meet the 
standards of the relevant international treaty. 
 The CteAT articulated this position in Aemei,
113
 noting that 
[t]he Committee’s finding of a violation of article 3 of the Convention in no way 
affects the decision(s) of the competent national authorities concerning the granting or 
refusal of asylum. The finding of a violation of article 3 has a declaratory character. 
Consequently, the State party is not required to modify its decision(s) concerning the 
granting of asylum; on the other hand, it does have a responsibility to find solutions 
that will enable it to take all necessary measures to comply with the provisions of 
article 3 of the Convention. These solutions may be of a legal nature (e.g. decision to 
admit the applicant temporarily), but also of a political nature (e.g. action to find a 
third State willing to admit the applicant to its territory and undertaking not to return 
or expel him in its turn).
114
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Two years later, the CTeAT qualified its position in a case which did not involve a risk of 
expulsion, as the complainant had a residence permit and his application for renewal had not 
yet been decided: 
Noting that the order for the author’s expulsion is still in force, the Committee 
considers that the possibility that the State party will grant the author an extended 
temporary permit for medical treatment is not sufficient to fulfil the State party’s 
obligations under article 3 of the Convention.
115
 
While the CteAT did not identify which particular immigration status would be required in 
order to comply with Article 3 CAT it made it clear that temporary residence permits based 
on circumstances whose nature is also temporary were in themselves insufficient to meet the 
standards of protection against refoulement required by the Convention. 
 Given the more comprehensive nature of other international human rights treaties, 
notably the ICCPR and the ECHR, their IHRMBs have had the chance to pronounce 
themselves on issues regarding the specific attachments –other than nationality- between 
individuals and States which may under certain circumstances require the State not merely not 
to expel the individual but rather to take positive measures to ensure their stay and integration 
in the host country. 
The HRC has considered quite extensively the relationship between individuals with 
States other than the one of nationality, and in particular the legal relevance of significant 
attachments other than nationality.
116
 In Stewart,
117
 the Committee was asked to define what 
constitutes one’s “own country” within the meaning of Article 12(4) ICCPR: “No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”. Mr Stewart was a British citizen 
who had moved to Canada at the age of seven and although he claimed that he only learnt that 
he had never acquired Canadian nationality as a result of proceedings resulting from his 42 
criminal convictions.
118
 
 The HRC elaborated on the notion of own’s “own country” in the Convention. The 
Committee noted that 
the scope of the phrase “his own country” is broader than the concept “country of his 
nationality”, which it embraces and which some regional human rights treaties use in 
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guaranteeing the right to enter a country. Moreover, in seeking to understand the 
meaning of article 12, paragraph 4, account must also be had of the language of article 
13 of the Covenant. That provision speaks of “an alien lawfully in the territory of a 
State party” in limiting the rights of States to expel an individual categorized as an 
“alien”. It would thus appear that “his own country” as a concept applies to individuals 
who are nationals and to certain categories of individuals who, while not nationals in a 
formal sense, are also not “aliens” within the meaning of article 13, although they may 
be considered as aliens for other purposes.
119
 
The question is therefore to determine which categories of non-nationals can invoke the 
protection of Article 12(4). The Committee acknowledges that determining who, in addition 
to nationals, is protected by this provision is less clear and it affirms that since 
the concept “his own country” is not limited to nationality in a formal sense, that is, 
nationality acquired on birth or by conferral, it embraces, at the very least, an 
individual who, because of his special ties to or claims in relation to a given country 
cannot there be considered to be a mere alien.
120
 
Having established the principle, the HRC then goes on to identify examples of such 
categories, such as those arbitrarily deprived of nationality: a) nationals of a country who 
have there been stripped of their nationality in violation of international law and b) 
individuals whose country of nationality has been incorporated into or transferred to another 
national entity whose nationality is being denied them.
121
 The list is clearly not exhaustive 
and the Committee further notes that “the language of article 12, paragraph 4, permits a 
broader interpretation, moreover, that might embrace other categories of long-term residents, 
particularly stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the 
country of such residence.”122 
 The Committee focused on the arbitrary nature of the measures which prevented 
individuals from acquiring formal links (that is, nationality) with the country where the live 
and as this was not an issue in the case in question, it did not find a violation of Article 12. 
The majority decision resulted in six of the Committee’s members issuing dissenting 
opinions. In particular, they felt that the finding of the majority that no violation existed 
reflected a very restrictive interpretation of Article 12(4). The dissenting opinion by 
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Committee members Ms Evatt and Ms Medina Quiroga (co-signed by Mr Aguilar Urbina and 
endorsed by Ms Chanet, Mr Prado Vallejo and Mr Bhagwati) strongly rejected the narrow 
focus of the majority: 
In our opinion, the Committee has taken too narrow a view of article 12, paragraph 4, 
and has not considered the raison d’être of its formulation. Individuals cannot be 
deprived of the right to enter “their own country” because it is deemed unacceptable to 
deprive any person of close contact with his family, or his friends or, put in general 
terms, with the web of relationships that form his or her social environment. This is 
the reason why this right is set forth in article 12, which addresses individuals lawfully 
within the territory of a State, not those who have formal links to that State. For the 
rights set forth in article 12, the existence of a formal link to the State is irrelevant; the 
Covenant is here concerned with the strong personal and emotional links an individual 
may have with the territory where he lives and with the social circumstances obtaining 
in it. This is what article 12, paragraph 4, protects.
123
 
They argued that “there are factors other than nationality which may establish close and 
enduring connections between a person and a country, connections which may be stronger 
than those of nationality.”124 In their view, the wording of the provision invites “consideration 
of such matters as long standing residence, close personal and family ties and intentions to 
remain (as well as to the absence of such ties elsewhere).”125 
 In his individual dissenting opinion, Bhagwati goes further in explaining what he sees 
as the correct approach to interpret Article 12(4): 
This is not a case of one single individual. Its decision will have an impact on the lives 
of tens of thousands of immigrants and refugees. […] If the view taken by the majority 
of the Committee is right, people who have forged close links with a country not only 
through long residence but having regard to various other factors, who have adopted a 
country as their own, who have come to regard a country as their home country, would 
be left without any protection. The question is: are we going to read human rights in a 
generous and purposive manner or in a narrow and constricted manner? Let us not 
forget that basically, human rights in the International Covenant are rights of the 
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individual against the State; they are protections against the State and they must 
therefore be construed broadly and liberally.
126
 
Hailbronner agrees with a broader interpretation of the right to return to one’s own country. 
Writing in the same year than the HRC was discussing the scope of the right, Hailbronner 
notes that the right to return as a matter of international law is not restricted to nationals. He 
explains that nationality may not always be clear and that States may be able to deprive 
certain groups among their population from nationality, and he affirms that international law 
offers legal basis for the recognition of a right to return to aliens who have been lawfully 
resident for a long period of time.
127
 
 The HRC formalized its position in its General Comment on Article 12, where it 
reproduced its line of reasoning in Stewart but added a significant paragraph which seems to 
take account of the minority position in the same decision. The HRC listed the examples that 
it had already identified in Stewart and noted that “[s]ince other factors may in certain 
circumstances result in the establishment of close and enduring connections between a person 
and a country, States parties should include in their reports information on the rights of 
permanent residents to return to their country of residence.”128 
More recently, the HRC pronounced itself again on the notion of one’s own country, 
in two controversial decisions. In Nystrom,
129
 the majority in this case “borrowed” language 
from the minority in Stewart, which later found its way into the General Comment on Article 
12, to note that there may be close and enduring connections between a person and a country, 
which may be stronger than those of nationality, and that the determination of one’s own 
country required consideration of long standing residence, close personal and family ties and 
intentions to remain.
130
 The HRC then found that the complainant had established that 
Australia was his own country and that  
there are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the right to enter one’s 
own country could be reasonable. A State party must not, by stripping a person of 
                                                 
126
 Ibid., Section E, p. 23. 
127
 K. Hailbroner, “Comments on: The Right to Leave, the Right to Return and the Question of a Right to 
Remain”, in V. Gowlland-Debbas (ed.), The Problems of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary International 
Law Issues, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1996, 109-118, at 116. 
128
 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, 2 Nov. 1999, para. 20. 
129
 HRC, Stefan Lars Nystrom v. Australia (2011), Communication No. 1557/2007. 
130
 Ibid., para. 7.4. See Stewart, Section C; see above footnotes 111 & 112. 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the Refugee Survey 
Quarterly following peer review. The version of record M-T Gil-Bazo, ‘Refugee Protection under International 
Human Rights Law: From Non-Refoulement to Residence and Citizenship’ (2015) 34(1) Refugee Survey 
Quarterly is available online at: http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org.  
 
31 
 
nationality or by expelling an individual to a third country, arbitrarily prevent this 
person from returning to his or her own country.
131
 
Like in Stewart, the decision prompted dissenting opinions by Neuman, Iwasawa, Rodley, 
Keller, and O’Flaherty who considered that the interpretation of Article 12 necessarily 
required a link with nationality or that it would only apply when the individual was deprived 
from any effective nationality.
132
 The Australian Government has also expressed its 
disagreements with the HRC’s views and despite the authority of this body to undertake an 
authentic interpretation of the ICCPR and of Australia’s recognition of its jurisdiction to hear 
individual communications, it declared that it would not comply with the Committee’s 
requests to allow and facilitate Mr Nystrom’s return to Australia.133 
 The position of the majority was also expressed in Warsame,
134
 where the Committee 
further elaborated on the circumstances in which the deprivation of the right would be 
reasonable, noting that “the author’s deportation to Somalia impeding his return to his own 
country would be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of preventing the commission of 
further crimes and therefore arbitrary.”135 This decision also resulted in dissenting opinions by 
the minority. 
Despite that the Committee’s views seem to be polarized in these two cases, as Whittle 
argues, “these decisions are not radical departures from Stewart; rather, they are best seen as 
gradual broadenings of the scope of art 12(4) to cater for the unique factual circumstances” of 
the cases.
136
 As he notes, in both cases “there were clear, ongoing and longstanding 
connections to the resident state and also no connection between the person and the ostensible 
state of his nationality.”137 
At regional level, the debate on the right of long term migrants to protection against 
expulsion from “their own country” has been held in the context of the ECHR. Protocol No. 4 
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to the ECHR (adopted before the ICCPR) protects nationals against expulsion.
138
 In 
Beldjoudi,
139
 Judge Martens elaborated on the notion of one’s own country in a concurring 
opinion. Recalling that the expulsion of nationals is prohibited, he stated that 
in a Europe where a second generation of immigrants is already raising children (and 
where violent xenophobia is increasing to an alarming extent) it is high time to ask 
ourselves whether this ban should not apply equally to aliens who were born and bred 
in a member State or who have otherwise, by virtue of long residence, become fully 
integrated there (and, conversely, become completely segregated from their country of 
origin). In my opinion, mere nationality does not constitute an objective and 
reasonable justification for the existence of a difference as regards the admissibility of 
expelling someone from what, in both cases, may be called his “own country”.140 
Martens’ position has been endorsed explicitly or implicitly in different opinions over the 
years to the Court’s case-law.141 In Boujlifa,142 Judges Baka and Van Dijk noted that “[t]he 
Court has been divided on the issue of the deportation of “second generation” immigrants for 
quite some time”143 and called on the Court to “abandon its casuistic approach to the matter 
and take a clear position on the question whether and to what extent so-called “second 
generation” immigrants constitute a special category for whose deportation very serious 
reasons have to be advanced to make it justifiable […].”144 
 The ECtHR’s case-law shows that the case-by-case approach remains dominant. Yet, 
the Court has gone as far as declaring that the denial of residence, of permanent residence and 
even of citizenship may constitute violation of ECHR-guaranteed rights. In Sisojeva,
145
 the 
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Court considered “that the prolonged refusal of the Latvian authorities to grant the applicants 
the right to reside in Latvia on a permanent basis constitutes an interference with the exercise 
of their right to respect for their private life.”146 It is important to note that this case did not 
involve the expulsion of the applicants, but rather the lack of regularization of their 
immigration status, and that two of the applicants had Russian nationality and an officially 
registered residence in Russia. The Court’s position was unequivocal in stating that “it is not 
enough for the host State to refrain from deporting the person concerned; it must also, by 
means of positive measures if necessary, afford him or her the opportunity to exercise the 
rights in question without interference.”147 The Court attached particular significance to the 
length of residence and the integration of the applicants in Latvia and the lack of effective 
attachment to their country of origin. The applicants had spent all, or almost all, of their lives 
in Latvia (both Latvia and their country of origin –Russia- were once part of the same State) 
and for the Court  
the fact remains that they have developed personal, social and economic ties strong 
enough for them to be regarded as sufficiently well integrated in Latvian society […] 
[and] none of the three applicants appears to have developed personal ties in [Russia] 
comparable to those they have established in Latvia”.148 
Accordingly, the Court found that “taking all the circumstances into account, and in particular 
the long period of insecurity and legal uncertainty which the applicants have undergone in 
Latvia”,149 there had been a violation of the right to respect for private life enshrined in 
Article 8 ECHR. 
 On 13 July 2010 the ECtHR ruled on the situation of the so-called “erased” in 
Slovenia in the case of Kurić and Others150. The “erased” were former Yugoslavian nationals 
who prior to 1991 did not enter Slovenia as aliens, but rather settled there as Yugoslavian 
citizens and registered their permanent residence in the same way as citizens of what was at 
the time the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. At the moment of the “erasure” (that is, the 
automatic transfer without notification of a significant number of former Yugoslavian citizens 
from the Register of Permanent Residents to the Register of Aliens without a Residence 
Permit) on 26 February 1992, the applicants had a particularly strong and privileged residence 
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status.
151
 The Slovenian Constitutional Court had already ruled that the “erasure” was 
unconstitutional. The Court found that 
the prolonged refusal of the Slovenian authorities to regulate the applicants’ situation 
comprehensively, in line with the Constitutional Court’s decisions, in particular the 
failure to pass appropriate legislation […] and to issue permanent residence permits to 
individual applicants, constitutes an interference with the exercise of the applicants’ 
rights to respect for their private and/or family life, especially in cases of 
statelessness.
152
 
And it ruled that such interference did not meet the standards required by Article 8 ECHR and 
accordingly constituted a violation of the Convention. The Court further noted that “an 
arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue”153 under the 
ECHR, thus opening the way for future findings. The case was referred to the Grand 
Chamber, which confirmed the earlier decision, ruling that “measures restricting the right to 
reside in a country may, in certain cases, entail a violation of Article 8 of the Convention”.154 
 While IHRMBs have been cautious in maintaining the principle of State sovereignty 
and noting the exceptional nature of restrictions to the power of the State to control its 
population, a trend is emerging among IHRMBs expressed in the debates just discussed, to 
affirm entitlements in terms of attachment and belonging for refugees in the political 
community, thus moving beyond the exceptional nature of international human rights law 
interference with State sovereignty.
155
 
 This approach may be slowly emerging and perhaps not yet consolidated among 
decision-makers but it was already postulated by Grahl-Madsen when he examined the plight 
of refugees without a country of asylum. He argued that when the State is unable to remove a 
refugee, he gains 
freedom of movement and residence [and it] follows that he must be considered 
‘lawfully’ (and ‘lawfully staying’) in the territory. And after a number of years 
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(normally about three years) his interest in growing roots must override any other 
considerations, which means that he may not be caused to leave the territory, merely 
because another country should prove willing to accept him.
156
  
Grahl-Madsen argued this position on the grounds that “[i]t has never been envisaged that 
there should be any group of underprivileged refugees, subject to the whims of the 
authorities”157 and that “as a State would not dream of expelling its own nationals […] there is 
hardly any reason for a State to press too hard for the expulsion of refugees”158 and therefore, 
“after a period of some three years, the interests of the refugee in remaining where he is, must 
normally be held to override any other considerations.”159 
While the Refugee Convention does not enshrine a right of residence, and in fact, the 
enjoyment of most of its provisions is conditional on the immigration status of the refugee 
(some can only be enjoyed by refugees “lawfully present” while others only by refugees 
“lawfully resident”), the notion of permanence is not alien to the Refugee Convention. Article 
34 imposes obligations on States Parties regarding naturalization: “The Contracting States 
shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in 
particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as 
possible the charges and costs of such proceedings.” The significance of this provision is 
often overlooked. Its relevance lies in the recognition that States’ obligations towards 
refugees include every effort to facilitate the full integration of refugees into the political 
community of the State of asylum. The inclusion of this article among the provisions of the 
1951 Refugee Convention (immediately after the prohibition of refoulement) seeks to restore 
the legal bond between the individual and the State, which had been previously severed by 
persecution and flight, and thus correct the “anomaly” that refugee status actually 
represents.
160
 The practice of States shows largely that domestic legislation has incorporated 
article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
5. Conclusion 
                                                 
156
 A. Grahl-Madsen, The Status of Refugees in International Law, Vol. II, Leiden, Sijthoff, 1972, 442 (emphasis 
added). 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 Ibid., 443. 
159
 Ibid., 437. 
160
 For a discussion on the background of article 34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, see R. Marx, “Article 34 
(Naturalization/Naturalisation)”, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A Commentary, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, 1441-1456. For a 
political analysis of asylum as surrogate membership of a political community in the asylum State, see M. E. 
Price, Rethinking Asylum: History, Purpose, and Limits, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the Refugee Survey 
Quarterly following peer review. The version of record M-T Gil-Bazo, ‘Refugee Protection under International 
Human Rights Law: From Non-Refoulement to Residence and Citizenship’ (2015) 34(1) Refugee Survey 
Quarterly is available online at: http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org.  
 
36 
 
This paper has examined the contribution of IHRMBs to refugee protection. It has explored 
the contribution of IHRMBs to the absolute nature of the principle of non-refoulement and 
with it, to its acceptance by State Parties, UNHCR, and the majority view in the literature as a 
rule of customary international law. The work of IHRMBs has led to the acceptance that 
protection of the broad categories of refugees covered by International Human Rights Law 
constitutes a legal obligation (and not merely a discretional decision) of States under 
International Law, an understanding that has led to the adoption of specific complementary 
instruments at regional level and the promotion of complementary forms of protection by 
UNHCR. 
It has also shown that a trend may be emerging among IHRMBs to enter into the 
details of the source of the risk of prohibited treatment and in particular to note that such risk 
may arise for reasons of race, religious beliefs, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, thus raising questions about the interpretation of the refugee definition in the 
Refugee Convention undertaken by State Parties and the available means for that State Party 
to reconcile its obligations both under International Human Rights Law and under 
International Refugee Law. This may mean that mechanisms need to be developed at 
domestic level for States to recognise refugee status and to grant asylum to refugees whose 
protection entitlement has been recognised by IHRMBs when the risk arises for one of the 
Refugee Convention recognised grounds. 
This paper has examined the jurisprudence of IHRMBs which moves beyond a finding 
of non-refoulement to discuss matters of status and in particular of security of residence and 
ultimately membership of the political community. The jurisprudence of IHRMBs suggests 
that refugees may have a legal entitlement to membership of the political community by 
virtue of their strong attachment to the State. This may not necessarily take the form of full 
nationality,
161
 although the arbitrary denial of citizenship may under certain circumstances 
constitute a violation of International Human Rights Law and in any case, States also have a 
duty to make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings for refugees. Yet, the 
development of strong links between refugees and the State where they find themselves 
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ultimately requires the State to “regularize” the situation of unlawfully present refugees and to 
provide them a country of asylum, which ultimately and by virtue of International Human 
Rights Law may become a country of citizenship. 
